ought immediately on their arrival at the front to have been brigaded—four or five regiments constituting one brigade,—and some competent regular army officer assigned to the command of each brigade. In this way some, at any rate, of the fundamental and indispensable ideas and habits of military life would have been acquired, and speedily acquired But, owing mainly, we suspect, to the inertia of General Scott, this was not done, and McDowell's urgent request made on June 4th, that "Line new troops" should "be organized into field brigades under active and experienced colonels in the army, while their regiments are being recruited,"[1] remained unheeded until a forward movement was in contemplation. In everything, in fact, the lack of a competent direction was manifest. There was extraordinary delay in furnishing horses for batteries, wagons for trains, ammunition, stores of all kinds. The generous devotion of the people, it is true, supplied many deficiencies, but it was painful to see the meagre results which, even with the aid of this devotion, were readied. The resources of the North were so enormous and the patriotism of the people was so unhesitating, that it cannot be doubted that the first three months of the war might have been

far more usefully employed, at any rate in the Eastern States,

On the Confederate side there was also a great

sponse to the President's call for 75,000 men. The volunteer regiments were those which were enlisted for three years or the war **in** the service of the United States in response to the proclamation of May 3<I.

! 2 W, R., 664 ; see also zV>., 719, 726, *Cf.* McDowell's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War ; 2, C W., 37,